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Abstract Atom is an anonymous messaging system that pro-
tects against traffic-analysis attacks. Unlike many prior sys-
tems, each Atom server touches only a small fraction of the
total messages routed through the network. As a result, the
system’s capacity scales near-linearly with the number of
servers. At the same time, each Atom user benefits from
“best possible” anonymity: a user is anonymous among all
honest users of the system, even against an active adversary
who monitors the entire network, a portion of the system’s
servers, and any number of malicious users. The architectural
ideas behind Atom have been known in theory, but putting
them into practice requires new techniques for (1) avoiding
heavy general-purpose multi-party computation protocols,
(2) defeating active attacks by malicious servers at minimal
performance cost, and (3) handling server failure and churn.
Atom is most suitable for sending a large number of short
messages, as in a microblogging application or a high-security
communication bootstrapping (“dialing”) for private messag-
ing systems. We show that, on a heterogeneous network
of 1,024 servers, Atom can transit a million Tweet-length
messages in 28 minutes. This is over 23× faster than prior
systems with similar privacy guarantees.
1 Introduction
In response to the widespread electronic surveillance of pri-
vate communications [69], many Internet users have turned to
end-to-end encrypted messaging applications, such as Signal
and OTR [2]. These encrypted messaging tools provide an ef-
fective way to hide the content of users’ communications from
a network eavesdropper. These systems do little, however,
to protect users’ anonymity. In the context of whistleblow-
ing [38, 76], anonymous microblogging [22], or anonymous
surveys [43], users want to protect their identities in addition
to the content of their communications.
Unfortunately, anonymity systems that protect against pow-
erful global adversaries typically cannot accommodate large
numbers of users. This is primarily due to the fact that tradi-
tional anonymity systems only scale vertically. These systems
consist of a handful of infrastructure servers that act collec-
tively as an anonymity provider; the system can only scale
by increasing the power of each participating server. Sys-
tems based both on classical mix-nets [18, 48, 72] and on
DC-nets [22, 76] suffer from this scalability challenge.
The Tor network [29], in contrast, is an example of an
anonymity system that scales horizontally. Tor consists of
a network of volunteer relays, and increasing the number of
these relays increases the overall capacity of the network.
This scalability property has enabled Tor to grow to handle
hundreds of thousands to millions of users [3]. However, the
fact that Tor provides low-latency anonymity also makes the
system vulnerable to a variety of deanonymization attacks [9,
17, 31, 44, 56, 74, 75].
In this paper, we present Atom, an anonymous messag-
ing system that takes important steps towards marrying the
best aspects of these two architectural strategies. Like Tor,
Atom scales horizontally: adding more servers to the network
increases the system’s overall capacity. Like mix-net- and DC-
net-based systems, Atom provides clear security properties
under precise assumptions.
Atom implements an anonymous broadcast primitive for
short, latency-tolerant messages. In doing so, Atom offers a
strong notion of anonymity: an adversary who monitors the
entire network, a constant fraction of servers, and any number
of users only has a negligible advantage at guessing which
honest user sent which message.
We target two applications in particular in this paper. The
first is an anonymous microblogging application. With Atom,
users can broadcast short messages anonymously to orga-
nize protests, whistleblow, or send other sensitive messages.
The second is a “dialing” application: many existing private
messaging systems [8, 50, 72] require pairs of users to first
establish shared secrets using some out-of-band means. Atom
can implement this sort of dialing system while providing
strictly stronger security properties than prior schemes can.
An Atom deployment consists of hundreds or thousands
of volunteer servers, organized into small groups. To use
the system, each user submits its encrypted message to a
randomly chosen entry group. Once each server group has
collected ciphertexts from a number of users, the group shuf-
fles its batch of ciphertexts, and forwards a part of each batch
to neighboring server groups. After the servers repeat this
shuffle-and-forward process for a certain number of itera-
tions, our analysis guarantees that no coalition of adversarial
servers can learn which user submitted which ciphertext. At
this point, each group decrypts the ciphertexts it holds to
reveal the anonymized plaintext messages.
Atom’s scalability comes from the fact that each group
of servers works locally, and only needs to handle a small
fraction of the total messages routed through the network. In
an Atom deployment routing M messages using N servers,
each Atom server processes a number of ciphertexts that
grows as O˜(M/N). In contrast, traditional verifiable-shuffle-
based or DC-net-based anonymity systems require each server
to do Ω(M2) work, irrespective of the number of servers in
the system [22, 48, 76].
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The design of Atom required overcoming three technical
hurdles. First, in a conventional mix-net, each user produces
an onion-style ciphertext, in which her message is encrypted
to each of the mix servers. In Atom, the user does not know
the set of servers its message will travel through a priori, so
she does not know which servers’ keys to use to encrypt her
message. Prior designs for distributed mix systems [55,63,78]
circumvented this problem with general-purpose multi-party
computation (MPC) protocols [11,35], but these general meth-
ods are currently too inefficient to implement. We instead
use a new rerandomizable variant of ElGamal [32] encryp-
tion, which allows groups of servers in the network to col-
laboratively and securely decrypt and reencrypt a batch of
ciphertexts to a subsequent group.
Second, Atom must maintain its security properties against
actively malicious servers. To protect against active attacks,
we group the servers in such a way that every group contains
at least one honest server with overwhelming probability. We
then rely on the honest server to ensure that certain invariants
hold throughout the system’s execution using two different
cryptographic techniques. The first method relies on verifiable
shuffles [33,39,59], which can proactively identify bad actors
but is computationally expensive. The second method is a
novel “trap”-based scheme, inspired by prior work on robust
mixing [46]. This scheme avoids using expensive verifiable
shuffles, but provides a slightly weaker notion of security: a
malicious server can remove κ honest users from the system
(without deanonymizing them) with probability 2−κ , thereby
reducing the size of the remaining users’ anonymity set.
Finally, Atom must handle network churn: with hundreds
or thousands of servers involved in the network, benign server
failures will be common. Our mechanism allows us to pick
a fault-tolerance parameter h, and Atom can tolerate up to
h−1 faults per group while adding less than two seconds of
overhead. Atom also provides a mechanism for recovering
from more than h−1 faults with some additional overhead.
To evaluate Atom, we implemented an Atom prototype in
Go, and tested it on a network of 1,024 Amazon EC2 ma-
chines. Our results show that Atom can support more than one
million users sending microblogging messages with 28 min-
utes of latency using 1,024 commodity machines. (Processing
this number of messages using Riposte [22], a centralized
anonymous microblogging system, would take more than 11
hours.) For a dialing application, Atom can support a million
users with 28 minutes of latency, with stronger guarantees
than prior systems [50, 72].
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• propose a horizontally scalable anonymity system that can
also defend against powerful adversaries,
• design two defenses to protect this architecture against
active attacks by malicious servers,
• design a fault-recovery mechanism for Atom, and
• implement an Atom prototype and evaluate it on a network
of 1,024 commodity machines.
With this work, we take a significant step toward bridging
the gap between scalable anonymity systems that suffer from
traffic-analysis attacks, and centralized anonymity systems
that fail to scale.
2 System overview
Atom operates by breaking the set of servers into many
small groups such that there exists at least one honest server
per group with high probability; we call such group an
anytrust [76] group. We then connect the groups using a
carefully chosen link topology.
Communication in Atom proceeds in time epochs, or proto-
col rounds. At the start of each round, every participating user
holds a plaintext message that she wants to send anonymously.
To send a message through Atom, each user pads her message
up to a fixed length, encrypts the message, and submits the
ciphertext to a user-chosen entry group. Each entry group
collects a predetermined number of user ciphertexts before
processing them.
After the collection, each group collectively shuffles their
set of messages. The group collaboratively splits the shuffled
messages into several batches and forwards each batch to a
different subsequent group. This shuffle-split-and-forward
procedure continues for a number of iterations, until a set of
exit groups finally reveal the users’ anonymized messages.
The exit servers can then forward these messages to either a
public bulletin board (e.g., for microblogging) or an address
specified in the message (e.g., for dialing).
Converting this high-level architecture into a working sys-
tem design requires solving a number of challenges:
1. How does Atom provide protection against traffic-
analysis attacks by a global adversary? (§3)
2. To whom do clients encrypt their messages? If clients do
not know which servers their messages will pass through,
standard mix-net-style onion encryption will not suffice.
(§4.2)
3. How does Atom protect users from malicious servers
who deviate from the protocol? (§4.3 and §4.4)
4. How does Atom remain resilient against server churn?
(§4.5)
2.1 Threat model and assumptions
An Atom deployment consists of a distributed network of
hundreds or thousands of servers, controlled by different indi-
viduals and organizations. A cryptographic public key defines
the identity of each server, and we assume that every partici-
pant in the system agrees on the set of participating servers
and their keys. (A fault-tolerant cluster of “directory author-
ities” could maintain this list, as in the Tor network [29].)
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Furthermore, we assume that the servers and the clients com-
municate over encrypted, authenticated, and replay-protected
channels (e.g., TLS). A large number of users—on the or-
der of millions—can participate in each round of the Atom
protocol.
We assume that the adversary monitors all traffic on the
network, controls a constant fraction f of the servers, and can
control all but two of the users. The adversarial servers may
deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way, and collude
with each other and adversarial users.
Atom can provide availability in the presence of fail-
stop server faults (§4.5), but not against Byzantine server
faults [49]. Our fault-tolerance technique could mitigate some
availability attacks, but we leave availability attacks out of
scope. That said, Atom does protect users’ anonymity in all
cases.
Finally, Atom does not attempt to prevent intersection at-
tacks [28, 45]. For example, if anonymous messages about
a protest in Turkey are only available when Alice is online,
then the adversary may be able to infer that Alice is sending
those messages. Atom does not protect against this attack,
but known techniques [41, 77] can mitigate its effectiveness.
2.2 System goals
Atom has three primary goals.
Correctness. At the end of a successful run of the Atom
protocol (i.e., a run that does not abort), each server holds
a subset of the plaintext messages sent through the system.
Informally, we say that the system is correct if the union
of the message sets held at all honest servers contains every
message that the honest users sent through the system.
Anonymity. Following prior work [16, 18, 22, 48, 76], we
say that Atom provides anonymity if an adversary who con-
trols the network, a constant fraction of the servers, and any
number of users cannot guess which honest user sent which
message with probability non-negligibly better than random
guessing. In particular, we require that the final permutation
of the honest users’ messages is indistinguishable from a ran-
dom permutation. Under this definition, a user is anonymous
among all honest users, not just the users who share the same
entry group, even if there is only one honest user in an entry
group.
Scalability. We say that an anonymity system is scalable if
the system can handle more users as the number of servers
grows. If there are M messages and N servers in the system,
we denote the number of ciphertexts each server processes
as C(M,N). We then require that holding C(M,N) fixed, M
scales linearly with N.
2.3 Cryptographic primitives
Atom relies on the following two cryptographic primitives.
We describe them at a high level here, and give the details in
Appendix A.
Rerandomizable encryption. Atom uses a rerandomizable
CPA-secure encryption scheme, which consists of the follow-
ing algorithms:
• (sk, pk)← KeyGen(). Generate a fresh keypair.
• c← Enc(pk,m). Encrypt message m using public key pk.
• m← Dec(sk,c). Decrypt ciphertext c using secret key sk.
• C′ ← Shuffle(pk,C). Rerandomize a vector C of cipher-
texts using public key pk, and randomly permute the com-
ponents of the vector.
• c′ = ReEnc(sk, pk,c). Strip a layer of encryption off of ci-
phertext c using secret key sk and add a layer of encryption
using public key pk. When pk = ⊥, this operation is the
same as Dec(sk,c).
For Atom, we require an additional property that the cryp-
tosystem allow “out-of-order” decryption and reencryption.
That is, given an onion-encrypted ciphertext, a server can
decrypt one of the middle layers of encryption and reencrypt
the ciphertext to a different public key.
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
(NIZKs). We make use of three NIZK constructions. We
use non-malleable NIZKs, meaning that the adversary cannot
use a NIZK for an input to generate a different NIZK for a
related input.
• (c,pi)← EncProof(pk,m). Compute c← Enc(pk,m) and
generate a NIZK proof of knowledge of the plaintext m
corresponding to c.
• (c,pi)← ReEncProof(sk, pk,m). Compute
c← ReEnc(sk, pk,m) and generate a NIZK proof pi that
this operation was done correctly (cf. [20]).
• (C′,pi)← ShufProof(pk,C). Permute the ciphertext set C
(using Shuffle) and generate a NIZK pi that C is a permuted
version of C′, reblinded using pk (cf. [10, 39, 59]).
When the operations other than Shuffle and ShufProof are
applied to a vector of ciphertexts C, we apply the operation
to each component of the vector.
3 Random permutation networks
In this section, we describe our solution to the first challenge:
how does Atom provide protection against traffic-analysis
attacks by a global adversary? We use a special network
topology that can provide anonymity against an adversary
that can view the entire network and control any number of
system users but that controls no servers. Then, in §4, we
describe how to protect against malicious servers.
We organize the Atom servers into a layered graph, and
each Atom server is connected to β other servers in the next
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Figure 1: An Atom deployment with four servers (S1 through S4),
arranged in the square topology. Each user submits her ciphertext to
an entry server of her choice. The servers perform T iterations of
mixing before outputting the plaintexts.
layer, where β is a fixed branching factor. An example topol-
ogy is shown in Figure 1 for β = 4. In each protocol run,
each user first chooses an Atom server (an “entry server”) and
encrypts her message with the public key of the server using a
rerandomizable encryption scheme. Each user then sends her
ciphertext to the entry server. Along with her ciphertext, the
user also provides a NIZK to prove she knows the underlying
plaintext, to prevent a malicious user from submitting a reran-
domized copy of an honest user’s ciphertext; this would result
in duplicate plaintexts at the end of the network, which would
immediately reveal the sender of the message. We include the
id of the server in the NIZK generation to prevent a malicious
user from resubmitting the exact copy of a ciphertext and
its NIZK to a different server. The details of this NIZK are
shown in Appendix A.
We assume that each entry server receives the same number
of messages. To achieve this in practice, an untrusted load-
balancing server could direct users to different entry servers.
We argue later in this section that every honest user of the
system is anonymous amongst all honest users of the system.
Thus, a user’s choice of entry group is not important for
security. Moreover, the untrusted server just directs the users
to a server, and does not actually route any messages. It
therefore cannot selectively remove users’ messages in an
attempt to launch an intersection attack.
Once the Atom entry servers collect a certain pre-specified
number of ciphertexts, the servers then begin a mixing process
that repeats for T iterations, where T is a parameter chosen
later on. In each iteration of the mixing process, each server
performs the following steps:
• Randomly permute the set of ciphertexts.
• Divide the ciphertexts into β batches of equal size.
• Reencrypt batch i∈ [1,β ] for the ith neighboring server and
forward the reencrypted batch to that server.
The servers repeat this permute-and-reencrypt process using
the incoming batches. After T iterations, each server in the
network holds a set of ciphertexts that has passed through T
other servers in the network. The exit servers can then decrypt
these ciphertexts and publish the corresponding plaintexts.
Security analysis. We use a particular network topology
called a random permutation network [23–26, 40] to connect
the servers. When the servers are organized into such a net-
work, the output of the network after carrying out the protocol
above is a near-uniform random permutation of all input mes-
sages. The adversary will thus have negligible advantage in
guessing which honest user sent which message over random
guessing. Atom is compatible with any good random permu-
tation network. In this work, we leverage prior analyses to
identify two simple candidate topologies:
Square network: Ha˚stad studied the problem of permuting
a square matrix of M elements by repeatedly permuting the
rows and columns [40]. His analysis gives rise to a random
permutation network on
√
M nodes in which each vertex
shuffles
√
M ciphertexts and connects to
√
M vertices on the
subsequent layer (Figure 1). Ha˚stad demonstrated that this
network produces a near-uniform random permutation after
only T ∈ O(1) iterations of mixing. In general, when we
have many more messages than servers (in particular when
N <
√
M), we can have each server “be responsible” for
multiple vertices in the network. For example, S1 and S2 in
t = 0 and 1 in Figure 1 could be handled by a single server.
Iterated-butterfly network: It was shown that O(logM) repe-
titions of a standard butterfly network yields an almost-ideal
random permutation network on M elements [26], where
each node in the butterfly network handles O(1) messages.
We say “almost ideal” because the network produces a ran-
dom permutation on a constant fraction of the M elements.
Adding a small constant fraction of dummy messages to the
system lets us use this network as if it produced a truly ran-
dom permutation [26]. Since a butterfly network has depth
O(logM), the total depth of the network is O(log2 M). If
there are fewer than M servers, then we again have a single
server emulate multiple nodes. The resulting N-server net-
work topology would have O(log2 N) depth, meaning there
would be T ∈ O(log2 N) iterations of mixing.
Efficiency. With M total messages in the network, each server
in each mixing iteration handles M/N messages. For the
square network, the number of mixing iterations satisfies
T ∈ O(1), and thus each server only handles O(M/N) cipher-
texts total in the square network. In the case of the iterated-
butterfly network, the number of messages each server han-
dles is O(MN · log2 N), since there are T ∈ O(log2 N) iterations.
For the rest of this paper, we focus on the square network,
since it will perform better in practice due to the shallower
depth. Both networks meet the scalability requirement as
both can handle more messages as we increase the number of
servers with a fixed C(M,N).
4 Atom protocol
In this section, we extend the protocol of §3 to defend against
actively malicious servers (i.e., servers who can tamper with
the messages). At a high level, we divide the servers into
anytrust groups, and replace the servers in the network with
the groups. Each group then simulates an honest server using
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our protocol, and we provide mechanisms to detect malicious
servers deviating from the protocol.
4.1 Anytrust group formation
The Atom servers are organized into groups. As we will see
later in this section, the security of Atom relies on each group
having at least one honest server in this setting. We ensure
this by using a public unbiased randomness source [14, 68] to
generate groups consisting of randomly sampled servers. We
set the group size large enough to ensure that the probability
that all servers in any group are malicious is negligible. Here,
we make an assumption that the adversary controls at most a
particular constant fraction f of the servers in the network.
For example, if we assume that the adversary controls
f = 20% of the servers, we can bound the probability that any
group consists of all malicious servers (“is bad”) by choosing
the group size k large enough. We compute:
Pr[One group of k servers is bad]≤ f k,
and then use the union bound to compute
Pr[Any of G groups of k servers is bad]≤ G · f k.
If we allow failure with probability at most 2−64 with
G = 1024 groups, then we choose the group size k = 32 such
that f k ·G < 2−64. Finally, we replace the servers with the
groups in the permutation network.
New groups are formed at the beginning of each round. In
practice, this operation will happen in the background, as the
rest of the protocol is carried out.
4.2 Basic Atom protocol
We first describe our protocol that enables each group to
collectively shuffle and reencrypt the message, without pro-
tection against active attacks. To send message m, the user
first picks her entry group. She then computes
(c,pi)← EncProof(pk,m), where pk is the group public key;
this produces an onion-encrypted ciphertext encrypted using
the public keys of all servers in the group. For ElGamal, for
example, pk would be the product of the public keys of all
servers in the group. She then sends (c,pi) to all servers in
the entry group, and pi is verified by all servers.
Once enough ciphertexts and proofs are received, each
group performs a specialized multi-party protocol for shuf-
fling the messages described in Algorithm 1. The security of
this protocol relies on Step 1 and Step 3. After Step 1, the
messages are permuted using the composition of all servers’
permutations. Since the honest server’s permutation is ran-
dom and unknown, the final permutation is secure as well.
Step 3 solves our second challenge: to whom do the users
encrypt their messages? Here, we use the special out-of-
order reencryption property of our cryptosystem (§2.3 and
Algorithm 1 Basic Atom group protocol
Form anytrust groups using the protocol in §4.1. A group
then takes a set of ciphertexts C as input, either from the
users if this server is in the first layer of the network or the
groups in the prior layer, and executes the following.
1. Shuffle: Each server s computes C′← Shuffle(C) in
order, and sends C′ to the next server.
2. Divide: If s is the last server of the group, then it di-
vides the permuted ciphertext set C′ into β evenly sized
batches (B1, . . . ,Bβ ), where β is the number of neigh-
boring groups. It sends (B1, . . . ,Bβ ) to the first server of
the current group.
3. Decrypt and Reencrypt: Server s receives batches
(B1, . . . ,Bβ ) from the previous server. In order, each
server s computes B′i = ReEnc(sks, pki,Bi) for each
batch where sks is the secret key of the current server and
pki is the group public key of the ith neighboring group.
If there are no neighbors (i.e., this is the last iteration of
mixing), then pki =⊥ for all i.
If s is the last server of the group, then it sends all B′i to
the first server in the ith neighboring group. Otherwise,
it sends them to the next server.
If s is the last server of a group in the last layer, then
(B′1, . . . ,B
′
β ) contains the plaintext messages.
Appendix A). A user only needs to encrypt for her entry group
(and need not know the path her message will take a priori),
and the entry group can reencrypt for the appropriate next
group. In particular, the first server decrypts a layer of en-
cryption of a ciphertext and reencrypts it for the next group
of servers. When the second server receives the resulting ci-
phertext, it can decrypt its layer of encryption, despite the fact
that the ciphertext was last encrypted with a different public
key. Since each message is simultaneously decrypted and
reencrypted for another group, all messages remain encrypted
under at least one honest server’s key until the last layer. Thus,
the adversary does not learn anything by observing the traffic
in intermediate mixing iterations.
4.3 Atom with NIZKs
We now describe the two different mechanisms that address
our third challenge: protecting against actively malicious
servers. First, each user generates her ciphertext and the
corresponding NIZK using EncProof, and submits them to
all servers in their entry groups. All servers then verify
the NIZKs, and report the verification result to all other
servers in the group. Our protocol then uses verifiable shuf-
fles [10, 39, 59] and verifiable decryption [20]: After each
operation in Algorithm 1, the server who shuffled or reen-
crypted the messages proves the correctness of its operation
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using NIZKs to all other servers in the group. The honest
server in each group will detect any deviation from the proto-
col. Algorithm 2 describes the details.
Algorithm 2 Atom group protocol with NIZKs
A group receives a set of ciphertexts C as input, as well as
the proof verification results of the previous layer.
1. Shuffle: In order, each server s does the following:
(a) Compute (C′,pi)← ShufProof(pk,C), where pk is
the current group public key.
(b) Send (C′,pi) to all servers in the group. All servers
in the group verify the proof pi , and send the result
of the verification to all servers in the group. All
servers then check that every server in the group
correctly verified the proof, and abort the protocol
if any server reports failure.
2. Divide: If s is the last server in the group, then server
s divides the permuted ciphertext set C′ into β evenly
sized batches (B1, . . . ,Bβ ), where β is the number of
neighboring groups. Server s sends (B1, . . . ,Bβ ) to the
first server.
3. Decrypt and Reencrypt: In order, each server s does
the following after it receives batches (B1, . . . ,Bβ ) from
the previous server:
(a) Compute (B′i,pii) = ReEncProof(sks, pki,Bi) for
each batch Bi, where sks is the secret key of the
current server and pki is the group public key of
the ith neighboring group.
(b) Send {(B′i,pii)}i∈[β ] to all servers in the current
group. Send them to all servers in all the neigh-
boring groups as well, if s is the last server of the
group. All servers that received the proofs {pii}i∈[β ]
verify them, and send the results of the verification
to all servers in the current group, and the neigh-
boring groups if s is the last server in the group.
Then, all servers who received the proofs check
that all other servers who verified the proofs re-
ported success, and abort the protocol if any server
reports failure.
If s is the last server of a group in the last layer, then
(B′1, . . . ,B
′
β ) contains the traps and the inner ciphertexts.
4.4 Atom with trap messages
Generating and verifying the zero-knowledge proofs imposes
a substantial computational cost on the servers. The verifiable
shuffle proposed by Neff [59], for instance, requires each
server to perform a number of exponentiations per element
being shuffled. Since every server needs to produce and verify
a number of these NIZK proofs, the extra computation can
be burdensome. Instead, we use a novel trap message-based
protection, inspired by prior work [46]. In this variant, each
user submits a “trap” ciphertext with the ciphertext of her
message. If a server misbehaves, it risks tampering with a
trap. We then provide a distributed mechanism to detect if a
trap has been modified.
The malicious servers may get lucky and tamper with a real
user message. As such, the trap variant of Atom provides a
slightly weaker notion of security than the NIZK variant: the
adversary could remove (but not deanonymize) up to κ honest
messages from the anonymity set with probability 2−κ . If the
number of honest users is large, as we expect in a scalable
system, this weaker anonymity property is almost as good
as the traditional anonymity property. The NIZK variant of
Atom can provide the stronger anonymity if needed.
This trap variant of Atom makes use of an extra anytrust
group of servers, which we call the trustees. The trustees first
collectively generate a per-round public key for the group,
with each trustee holding a share of the matching secret key.
Users then encrypt their messages using a double-enveloping
technique [37]: each user first encrypts her messages using
the trustees’ public key with an IND-CCA2 secure encryption
scheme [58, 62], which ensures that the resulting ciphertext
cannot be modified in anyway. Then, the user encrypts the
resulting ciphertext, which we call inner ciphertexts, with
the group key of her entry group. More precisely, to send a
message m, a user
1. encrypts m using the trustees’ public key pkT :
cM ← "EncCCA2(pkT ,m)‖M", where M indicates that cM
is an inner ciphertext,
2. picks an entry group. Let gid be the index of the entry
group,
3. chooses a random nonce R and generates a “trap mes-
sage” as cT ← "gid‖R‖T", where T indicates that cT is
a trap message,
4. computes (c0,pi0)← EncProof(pk,cM),
(c1,pi1)← EncProof(pk,cT ), and the cryptographic
commitment CT of cT , where pk is the public key of
the entry group (since the nonces are high-entropy, we
can use a cryptographic hash like SHA-3 [30] as a com-
mitment),
5. sends (c0,pi0) and (c1,pi1) in a random order along with
CT to all servers in her entry group.
The servers verify pi0 and pi1 when they receive them. Once
a group collects enough ciphertexts and commitments, each
group carries out Algorithm 1, treating each ciphertext (real
or trap) as an independent message. At the end of the protocol,
the last server checks its subset of messages. It then forwards
(1) each trap message to all servers in the group indicated by
the gid field, and (2) each inner ciphertext to all servers in
the group chosen by a deterministic function that will load-
balance the number of ciphertexts forwarded to a group (e.g.,
using universal hashing).
Each server reports the following to the trustees:
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1. Submit traps and 
   inner ciphertexts
2. Shuffle and decrypt
...
4. Report shuffle 
    correctness
5. Release 
    decryption key
6. Decrypt inner
    ciphertext
 
3. Sort the traps and
    the inner ciphertexts 
Trustees
Figure 2: Atom with trap messages and trustees.
1. a bit indicating whether every trap commitment has a
matching trap and vice-versa.
2. a bit indicating that all inner ciphertext has been for-
warded correctly (e.g., hash is the expected value), and
that there are no duplicate inner ciphertexts.
3. the number of traps and inner ciphertexts.
Each trustee releases its share of the decryption key if and
only if every server in every group reports no violation and
the total number of traps is the same as the total number of
inner ciphertexts. Otherwise, each trustee deletes its share
of the secret key. If the trustees release the decryption key,
then each server decrypts the inner ciphertexts to recover the
actual messages. Figure 2 summarizes the protocol.
Security analysis. The messages sent in one round cannot
be replayed in another round because the group keys change
across rounds. Thus, we only consider the security of one
round. The servers cannot tamper with any trap messages
since the honest server in each group holds the commitments
to all traps it is expecting to see. Moreover, because the traps
are mixed independently of the real messages, the final lo-
cations of traps do not leak any information about the real
messages. We then use IND-CCA2 encryption, which creates
non-malleable ciphertexts, to prevent the adversary from tam-
pering with the inner ciphertexts to create related ciphertexts.
The adversary could still, however, duplicate, drop, or replace
an inner ciphertext.
The servers first explicitly check for duplicates, and abort
the protocol upon finding any. When a malicious server re-
moves or replaces a ciphertext, there is at least 50% chance
that the modified ciphertext is a trap message because the
users submit the ciphertexts in a random order and the cipher-
texts are indistinguishable. Thus, if a server drops or replaces
a single ciphertext, it causes the entire protocol run to abort
with probability 50%. The adversary can, however, remove or
replace κ messages successfully with probability 2−κ . Since
each successful tampering reduces the anonymity set of all
users by one, the adversary can reduce the anonymity set
size by at most κ with probability 2−κ . This attack does
not impact the privacy of the tampered ciphertexts: the re-
moved inner ciphertexts are always encrypted under at least
one honest server’s key, and thus the plaintext messages of
the replaced messages are never revealed.
4.5 Tolerating server churn
The failure of any server–even a benign one–in the protocols
described thus far prevents the failed server’s group from
making progress. This is an important challenge for Atom:
with hundreds or thousands of volunteer servers involved in
each round, server failures are bound to happen. To address
this issue, we modify Atom to use threshold anytrust groups
that we call “many-trust groups”. We construct the groups
such that there are at least h honest servers in each group, and
enable each group to tolerate up to h−1 failures.
When using Atom with many-trust groups, we replace each
group public key with the key of a threshold cryptosystem.
In a k-server group, we share the keys in such a way that any
k− (h− 1) servers can decrypt messages encrypted for the
group’s key. Since there are at least h honest servers in each
group, any subset of k− (h− 1) servers contains an honest
server. With such groups, Atom works similar to the anytrust
variant, except that only k− (h−1) group members need to
participate.
Our fault-tolerance mechanism requires two changes to the
network setup described in §4.1. First, we need to increase
the group size k to ensure existence of h honest servers per
group. For example, when h= 2, f = 20%, we need k≥ 33 to
achieve failure probability < 2−64 (compared to k≥ 32 when
h = 1). In the common case, however, only 32 = k− (h−1)
servers need to handle the messages, meaning the messaging
latency does not increase in this case. Appendix B shows how
to compute k, and how large k must be for different values of
h.
Second, each group must generate its threshold encryption
keys. In Atom, we use a dealer-less distributed verifiable
secret sharing (DVSS) protocol [67] to generate the keys to
avoid having a single trusted dealer who knows the secret
key. When a group is first formed, all servers in the group
participate in a round of the DVSS protocol. The public output
of this protocol is the group public key and the secret key is
secret shared among the k servers. For subsequent rounds,
the servers can perform this operation in the background as
they mix the messages for the current round.
Atom also provides a way to recover from more than h−1
failures in a group using what we call buddy groups. When
groups are formed in the beginning of a round, each group
picks one or more buddy groups. Each server then secret
shares its share of the group private key with the servers in
each of the buddy groups. When more than h−1 servers in
a group fail, a new anytrust group is formed. Each server
in the new group then collects the shares of the private key
from one of the buddy groups, and reconstructs a share of
the group private key. This allows Atom to recover from a
group failure as long as one of its buddy groups is online. In
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principle, Atom could use an extra anytrust group of highly
available servers not in the actual network as a buddy group
for all groups to minimize the chance of network failure; for
example, the trustee group can be used for this purpose in the
trap-variant of Atom.
4.6 Malicious users in Atom
In the NIZK variant of Atom, malicious users cannot cause a
protocol run to halt. In the trap variant, however, malicious
users could potentially disrupt a round by submitting (1) miss-
ing, incorrect, or extra traps, or (2) duplicate inner ciphertexts.
Since the servers check the traps only once the routing has
completed, Atom with traps unfortunately cannot proactively
prevent such attacks. However, Atom does provide a way to
identify the malicious users after a misbehavior is detected.
To identify disruptive users, all entry groups first reveal their
private keys. Then, all servers in each group decrypt the ci-
phertexts they received, and publish the resulting traps and
inner ciphertexts to all other servers, along with the original
sender of each message and the commitments of the traps.
Each server then checks if each decrypted trap matches the
corresponding commitment and vice-versa, and reports any
user who fails this check. It also reports any users who sub-
mitted the same inner ciphertexts. Once the malicious users’
identities are known, the system maintainer could take ap-
propriate actions (e.g., blacklist the users). If the DoS attack
is persistent after many rounds, Atom can fall back to using
NIZKs, effectively trading off performance for availability.
4.7 Organizing servers
Ensuring maximal server utilization. To maximize the per-
formance, we need to fully utilize all servers at all times. A
naı¨ve layout of the servers, however, will cause a lot of idle
time. For example, the second server in a group cannot do
any useful work until the first server finishes. To ensure that
every server is active as much as possible, we “stagger” the
position of a server when it appears in different groups (e.g.,
server s is the first server in the first group, second server in
the second group, etc.). This can help minimize idle time.
Changing the positions of the servers within a group does
not impact the security of the system, since the security only
depends on the existence of an honest server.
Pipelining. In scenarios where throughput is more important
than latency, Atom can be pipelined. When we organize the
servers, we can assign different sets of servers to different
layers of our network. The network can then be pipelined
layer by layer, and output messages every one group’s worth
of latency. We do not explore this trade-off in this paper, as
latency is more important for the applications we consider.
5 Implementation and applications
We implemented an Atom prototype in Go in approximately
3,500 lines of code, using the Advanced Crypto Library [1].
Our prototype implements both protection against active
attacks (§4.3 and §4.4) and our fault-tolerance protocol
(§4.5). We use the NIST P-256 elliptic curve [6] for our
cryptographic group, threshold ElGamal encryption [65]
for our fault-tolerance scheme, and Neff’s verifiable shuffle
technique for the zero-knowledge proof of shuffle correct-
ness [59]. For our IND-CCA2-secure encryption scheme,
we use a key encapsulation scheme with ElGamal [66], de-
scribed in Appendix A. The source code is available at
github.com/kwonalbert/atom. We now highlight two
particularly suitable applications for Atom.
Microblogging. Microblogging is a broadcast medium in
which users send short messages. For example, Twitter is a
microblogging service that supports messages up to 140 char-
acters. In several cases, anonymity is a desirable property
for microblogging: protest organizers can announce their
plans, and whistleblowers can publicly expose illegal activi-
ties without fearing repercussions. Atom is a natural fit for
such applications. To blog, a user sends a short message
through the Atom network. The servers then put the plaintext
messages on a public bulletin board where other users can
read them. We use 160 byte messages in our evaluation.
Dialing. Several private communication systems [8, 50, 72]
require a dialing protocol by which pairs of users can establish
a shared secret. Atom supports a dialing protocol, similar to
that of Vuvuzela [72] and Alpenhorn [50]. To dial another
user Bob, the initiator Alice encrypts her public key using
Bob’s public key. Then, she sends her encrypted key and
Bob’s identifier id (e.g., his public key) through the Atom
network. The servers at the last layer put the encrypted keys
into mailboxes based on the identifier. There are m mailboxes,
and each dialing message is forwarded to mailbox id mod
m. Finally, Bob downloads the contents of the mailbox that
contains the requests for him, decrypt the messages, and
establishes a shared key with Alice.
To hide the number of dialing calls a user receives, we
employ the differential privacy technique proposed by Vu-
vuzela. We require one of the anytrust groups (which could
be the trustees in the trap variant) to generate dummy dialing
messages for each mailbox, where the number of dummies
is determined using differential privacy. Then, these dummy
messages are distributed evenly across the Atom network, and
routed along with the actual users’ dialing messages. We refer
the readers to prior work [72] for detailed privacy analysis of
the required number of dummies.
The size of each dialing message can differ depending on
the cryptosystem used and the security guarantees. In the
simplest version in which a user simply sends an encrypted
public key of an elliptic curve cryptosystem, the message
size can be as small as 80 bytes (Bob’s public key + AEAD
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Table 3: Performance of the cryptographic primitives.
Primitives Latency (s)
Enc 1.40 ·10−4
ReEnc 3.35 ·10−4
Shuffle (1,024 messages) 1.07 ·10−1
Prove Verify
EncProof 1.62 ·10−4 1.39 ·10−4
ReEncProof 6.55 ·10−4 4.46 ·10−4
ShufProof (1,024 messages) 7.57 ·10−1 1.41 ·100
Table 4: Latency to create an anytrust group.
Group size 4 8 16 32 64
Setup latency (ms) 7.4 29.4 93.3 361.8 1432.1
encrypted Alice’s public key). For more sophisticated dialing
protocols, the messages can be larger. Alpenhorn [50], for
instance, uses identity-based encryption, and each message
is approximately 300 bytes. Our prototype implements the
simpler 80 byte message dialing scheme.
6 Evaluation
To evaluate Atom, we performed two classes of experiments.
In the first set of experiments, we measured the performance
of a single anytrust group. In the second, we perform end-
to-end experiments using a large number of machines. In
these latter experiments, we verify that the system can (1)
handle a large number of messages, and (2) scale horizontally.
We carried out our experiments in the us-east-1 region of
Amazon EC2, but we artificially introduced a latency between
40 and 160 ms for each pair of servers (using tc in Linux) to
emulate a more realistic network environment. The machines
communicated over TLS channels.
6.1 Anytrust group performance
Experimental setup. To understand the performance of the
building blocks of an Atom network, we measured the latency
of the cryptographic operations and one mixing iteration.
We used Amazon EC2’s c4.xlarge instances for most of the
experiments in this section, which have four Intel Haswell
Xeon E5-2666 vCPUs with 7.5 GB of memory. For these
experiments, we fix the message size at 32 bytes. The latency
increases linearly with the message size, as we use more
points to embed larger messages; i.e., a 32-byte message is
one elliptic curve point, a 64-byte message is two elliptic
curve points, etc.
Cryptographic primitives. Table 3 shows the performance
of the cryptographic primitives used by Atom.
Group setup time. Table 4 shows the latency to generate an
anytrust group of different sizes. The threshold key genera-
tion (DVSS [67]) is the dominating cost. For all group sizes
of fewer than 64 servers, the setup takes less than two sec-
onds. In practice, we expect this overhead to be even lower,
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Figure 5: Time per mixing iteration for a single group of 32 servers
as the number of messages varies.
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Figure 6: Time per mixing iteration for a single group when routing
1,024 messages as the group size varies.
since the servers can organize themselves into groups in the
background as they mix the messages for the current round.
NIZKs vs. traps. To compare the performance of the two
techniques for defending against malicious servers, we cre-
ated a single anytrust group with 32 servers, and measured the
time required to complete one mixing iteration. The number
of messages varied from 128 to 16,384 messages, which is
the expected range of message load per group. In the trap
version of Atom, we accounted for the trap messages as well,
which doubled the actual number of messages handled by
each group. For example, if there are 1,024 groups and 220
messages, each group would handle 1,024 messages in the
NIZK variant and 2,048 messages in the trap variant.
As shown in Figure 5, the mixing time of both modes
increases linearly with the number of messages, since the
mixing time largely depends on the number of ciphertexts
each server has to shuffle and reencrypt. The NIZK variant
takes about four times longer than the trap variant due to
costly proof generation and verification. Based on this, we
estimate that a full Atom network using NIZKs would be four
times slower than a trap-based Atom network.
Group size. The size of each anytrust group in Atom depends
on the security parameter and f , the fraction of servers that
are adversarial. Figure 6 demonstrates the impact of group
size on the mixing iteration time when the group handles
1,024 messages. For both schemes, the mixing time increases
linearly with the group size, since each additional server adds
another serial set of shuffling and reencryption operations.
9
4 8 16 36
Number of cores
2
4
6
8
S
p
e
e
d
-u
p
Trap
NIZK
Figure 7: Speed-up of one mixing iteration of Atom as we increase
the number of cores on a server. The baseline is when all servers
have four cores.
Figure 8: The Tor network topology [70] (left) and our network
topology (right). The size of a node indicates its capacity; very high-
capacity nodes are in green. In our topology, links within a cluster
have 40 ms latency and across clusters have 80-160 ms latency.
While our fault tolerance parameter h impacts the group size
k as well, only k− (h−1) servers handle the messages in a
given iteration since k− (h−1) servers is enough to decrypt
the threshold encrypted ciphertexts.
Number of cores. The computations that the Atom servers
perform are highly parallelizable, especially for the trap vari-
ant. Adding more cores to each server decreases the overall
latency in proportion. To demonstrate this effect, we created
an anytrust group of 32 servers using EC2 c4 nodes with 4, 8,
16, and 36 cores, and we routed 1,024 messages through them.
Figure 7 shows the speed-up of different anytrust groups over
the one consisting of only four core servers. The speed-up is
nearly linear for the trap-variant, since majority of the load is
parallelizable. The speed-up of the NIZK variant is sub-linear
because the NIZK proof generation and verification technique
we use is inherently sequential.
6.2 Large-scale evaluation of Atom
Experimental setup. In this set of experiments, we used
up to 1,024 various Amazon EC2 machines to test Atom’s
scalability and performance using the trap variant of Atom. In
each experiment, 80% of the servers had 4 cores (c4.xlarge),
10% had 8 cores (c4.2xlarge), 5% had 16 cores (c4.4xlarge),
and 5% had 32 cores (c4.8xlarge). We used the bandwidth
statistics of the Tor network [3] as a proxy to chose the servers
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Figure 9: Latency of Atom for microblogging and dialing for varying
number of messages. The latency increases linearly with the number
of messages.
for our network1: 80% of the servers have less than 100 Mbps,
10% have between 100 Mbps and 200 Mbps, 5% have be-
tween 200 Mbps and 300 Mbps, and 5% have over 300 Mbps
of available bandwidth. Figure 8 shows our network topology.
We picked the system parameters assuming f = 20% of
the servers are malicious. We set up our groups to handle one
server failure for each group (§4.5). Thus, we set the group
size to 33 servers, and required 32 out of the 33 servers to
route the messages. Finally, we used µ = 13,000, where µ is
the average number of dummy messages by each server in an
anytrust group for differential privacy [72]. Thus, on average,
we expect about 32 ·µ = 410,000 dummy messages total in
the network for anytrust groups of 32 servers.
We used T = 10 iterations with the square network for the
evaluation. To measure the latency of one round of protocol
run, we measure the time lapse between the moment that the
first server in the first layer receives a message and the last
server in the last layer outputs a message.
We answer the following questions in this section:
• Can Atom support a large number of users?
• How does Atom scale horizontally?
• How does Atom compare to prior systems?
Number of messages. We used 1,024 servers organized into
1,024 groups, and measured the latency as the total number
of messages varied. As Figure 9 shows, the latency increases
linearly with the total number of messages, since the number
of messages handled by each group increases linearly with
the total number of messages. The difference in the slope
between the two applications is due to the smaller message
size for dialing. For both applications, our prototype can
handle over a million users with a latency of 28 minutes.
Horizontal scalability. To demonstrate that Atom scales hor-
izontally, we measured the end-to-end latency for the network
to route a million microblogging messages as the number of
servers varied. As shown in Figure 10, the network speeds up
linearly with the number of servers. That is, an Atom network
with 1,024 servers is twice as fast as one with 512 servers.
1Statistics on core counts of Tor servers were not available.
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Figure 11: Simulated speed-up of Atom networks of varying sizes
relative to an Atom network of 1,024 servers when routing a billion
microblogging messages. At this scale, the speed-up is sub-linear in
the number of servers.
We also simulated larger Atom networks to show further
scalability. Here, we modified the implementation to model
the expected latency given an input using values shown in
Table 3, instead of actually performing the operations. We
then had each physical server in our network emulate a large
number of logical servers. Figure 11 shows the simulated
latency when routing over a billion microblogging messages
using larger Atom networks. Unlike the cases with less than
1,024 servers, we observed that the speed-up is slightly sub-
linear in the number of servers. We believe there were two
reasons for this. First, there are G2 connections between two
layers where G is the number of servers per layer. When
there are tens of thousands of groups per layer, the number of
connections became unmanageable for some servers. Second,
the single trustee group experienced performance degradation.
While the trustees could handle tens of thousands of TLS
connections, the overhead of establishing TLS connection
became non-negligible at this scale.
Comparison to prior work. Table 12 compares the perfor-
mance of Atom to that of three prior works: Riposte [22],
Vuvuzela [72], and Alpenhorn [50]. Riposte is an anonymous
microblogging system that uses centralized anytrust servers.
To compare Atom’s microblogging capabilities, we used the
fastest variant of Riposte which uses three 36-core machines
Table 12: Latency to support a million users. For microblogging,
Atom is 23.7× faster than Riposte with 1,024 servers. Vuvuzela is
56× faster than Atom for dialing.
Latency (min.)
Microblog Dial
Hardware
(
Speedup
vs. Riposte
) (
Slowdown
vs. Vuvuzela
)
Config.
Atom 128×mixed 228.7 (2.9×) 225.1 (450×)
256×mixed 113.4 (5.9×) 112.6 (225×)
512×mixed 56.3 (11.9×) 55.5 (111×)
1024×mixed 28.2 (23.7×) 27.9 (56×)
Alpenhorn [50] 3×c4.8xlarge – 0.5 (1×)
Vuvuzela [72] 3×c4.8xlarge – 0.5 (1×)
Riposte [22] 3×c4.8xlarge 669.2 (1×) –
configured to handle a million messages. As shown in Ta-
ble 12, Riposte takes approximately 11 hours to anonymize a
million messages. Atom can support a million microblogging
messages in 3.8 hours with 128 servers and 28 minutes with
1,024 servers, which is 2.9× and 23.7× faster than Riposte.
While Atom uses many more servers to achieve better per-
formance, Riposte cannot take advantage of more servers
without additional security assumptions. In particular, Ri-
poste could scale by replacing each logical server with a
cluster of physical servers. An adversary, however, still needs
to only compromise one server from each cluster to break the
security of the system.
Vuvuzela and Alpenhorn are private messaging systems
with centralized anytrust servers that also support dialing.
We show the dialing latency with one million users for the
two systems when the network consists of three 36-core ma-
chines with 10 Gbps connection between them. These two
systems are approximately 56× faster than Atom for mainly
two reasons: (1) more efficient cryptography, as they use
hybrid encryption, while Atom uses public key encryption,
and (2) their machines are more powerful than the average
machine in our network. Although Atom is slower, we still
believe it is suitable for dialing. For example, Alpenhorn [50]
suggests running a dialing round once every few hours due
to client bandwidth limitations. Atom can support more than
two million users on this time scale.
Atom also offers three concrete benefits over Vuvuzela and
Alpenhorn. First, the bandwidth requirement for each server
is significantly lower. Vuvuzela servers use 166 MB/sec of
bandwidth for all servers [72], while Atom servers use less
than 1 MB/sec of bandwidth. Second, Atom provides a clear
way to scale further: adding more servers to our network
will reduce the overall latency. Vuvuzela or Alpenhorn could
replace each logical server with a cluster of servers to scale-
out. However, similar to Riposte, the adversary only needs
to compromise a server in each cluster to break the security
of the system. Finally, Atom can provide additional privacy
by preventing servers from tampering with honest users’ mes-
sages. Vuvuzela and Alpenhorn do not aim to prevent servers
from tampering with the users’ messages, and as a result, a
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malicious server can drop all but one honest user’s messages
(the honest user will still be protected via differential privacy).
In Atom, we guarantee that the users will enjoy anonymity
among all honest users in addition to differential privacy.
7 Discussion and future work
We now discuss some aspects of Atom we did not consider in
this paper and describe potential future work.
Estimated deployment costs. The deployment cost of a
server depends on compute and bandwidth cost. When renting
compute power from a commercial cloud service, the cost is
usually fixed per hour of uptime. For example, if a volunteer
wants to maintain a 100% up-time with a four core server on
Amazon AWS, it would cost about $146/month, while a 36-
core server would cost about $1,165/month as of September
2017.
The bandwidth cost depends on the number and the size of
messages routed by the server, but we can estimate an upper
bound by calculating the bandwidth requirement to rate-match
the compute power of the server. Based on our microbench-
marks of the cryptographic primitives (Table 3), a four core
server in the trap variant of Atom can reencrypt about 2,700
messages/second and shuffle about 9,200 messages/second
when each message is 32 bytes. This translates to about
90KB/second and 300KB/second of bandwidth respectively.
Assuming a constant flow of 300KB/second, the upper bound
on the bandwidth cost would be about $7.20/month on AWS.
For a 36-core server, this cost would scale linearly, and would
cost about $65/month.
Denial-of-service. Our focus in this work was on providing
scalable anonymity in the face of a near-omnipresent adver-
sary. We explicitly left availability attacks out of scope. Our
fault-tolerance mechanism (§4.5), however, can help defend
against a small number of malicious failures as well: as long
as there are fewer than h failures per group, benign or ma-
licious, Atom can recover. Defending against a large scale
DoS (e.g., in which the attacker takes more than half of the
servers offline) remains an important challenge for future
work. Proactively defending against malicious users in the
trap variant is another important future work, as Atom can
only retroactively identify malicious users after a disruption
happens (§4.6).
Load balancing. In a real-world Atom deployment, there
will be some variances in the capacity of the servers; e.g.,
number of cores, amount of available bandwidth, memory,
etc. From a performance perspective, it would be beneficial
to have the more powerful servers appear in more groups.
Such non-uniform assignments of servers to groups, however,
could result in an adversary controlling a full Atom group. We
must therefore be careful when load-balancing servers, but the
degradation in security may be worth the performance gain
in practice. Tor [29], the only widely deployed anonymity
network, makes this trade-off: servers with more available
bandwidth are more likely picked when forming a Tor circuit.
Intersection attacks by servers. Apart from the intersection
attacks [28, 45] naturally occurring due to the changes in
the set of Atom users, malicious servers in the trap variant
of Atom could attempt to launch an intersection attack by
selectively removing a user’s ciphertexts. It is not possible,
however, to remove both trap and message ciphertexts with-
out getting caught, since the commitments of the traps are
made available to all servers. Thus, the malicious server has
to guess the real ciphertext to remove. As a result, the ad-
versary performing such an attack on one user is caught with
probability 50%, and this probability is amplified to 2−κ for
κ trials. Therefore, while Atom does not completely prevent
intersection attacks by the servers, it does limit the number of
times the adversary can attempt this attack.
8 Related work
Tor [29] is the only anonymous communication system in
widespread use today. Like Atom, Tor scales horizontally.
Unlike Atom, Tor aims to support low-latency real-time traf-
fic streams, and Tor does not aim to defend against a global
network adversary. Recent analysis of the Tor network sug-
gests that even certain local adversaries may be able to de-
anonymize Tor users [17, 42, 60, 74].
Free-route mix-nets [27, 51, 57, 64] also scale horizontally.
As with Tor, these systems do not provide strong anonymity
properties in the face of powerful global adversaries. When
the adversary can monitor the entire network and control
some servers, the anonymity properties of these systems can
degenerate to the set of users who share the same entry point
to the network.
Mix-nets [18] and Dining Cryptographer networks (DC-
Nets) [19] are the earliest examples of anonymity systems
that provide protection against global adversaries. However,
neither of these systems scales horizontally: mix-nets incur
overhead linear in the number of servers, and DC-Nets incur
overhead quadratic in the number of participants. Systems
that build on these primitives [34, 48, 76] face similar prob-
lems when trying to scale. Riposte [22] is an anonymous
microblogging system that uses techniques from private infor-
mation retrieval [21] to scale to millions of users. Like a DC-
Net, Riposte requires each server to perform work quadratic
in the number of messages sent through the system.
The parallel mix-net of Golle and Juels [36] uses a dis-
tributed network of mix servers, similar to Atom. In this
mix-net, Borisov showed that if the adversary controls some
inputs and learns the output positions of the controlled in-
puts, then the adversary can infer some information about the
messages sent by the honest users [15]. In contrast, knowing
output positions of some users’ messages in Atom does not
result in anonymity loss for the other users.
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Vuvuzela [72] and Alpenhorn [50] are two recent private-
messaging systems that also provide dialing mechanisms
that a user can use to establish a shared secret with another
user. Both systems require all messages to pass through a
centralized set of servers, making the systems scale only
vertically. Moreover, contrary to Atom, malicious servers in
these systems can drop all but one honest user’s messages. In
Atom, we ensure no honest users’ messages are tampered with.
Thus, Atom can provide anonymity in addition to differential
privacy.
Vuvuzela also provides point-to-point metadata-hiding
communication (not anonymity). Using Vuvuzela, two users
who share a secret can communicate via the system without
an adversary learning that these two users are communicating.
Vuvuzela, however, cannot be used to anonymously organize
protests, since the recipient of a message always knows its
sender. Pung [8] addresses the same problem as Vuvuzela,
but does so without the need for an anytrust assumption. Pung
instead relies on computational private information retrieval,
which escapes the need for trust assumptions but comes with
significant computational costs [47].
Stadium [71] is a recent work that aims to horizontally
scale Vuvuzela (i.e., private point-to-point communication)
using distributed anytrust groups in a similar way to Atom.
Stadium uses a system architecture inspired by the parallel
mix-net [36] instead of permutation networks, and uses verifi-
able shuffle and cover traffic (dummy messages) to achieve a
differential private notion of security. Stadium achieves lower
latency than Atom by verifiable shuffling only the metadata
of each message (e.g., a digest). The actual messages are en-
crypted using efficient hybrid encryption, and the servers after
each iteration of mixing check that the metadata matches the
ciphertexts. This strategy cannot be used in Atom since a user
does not know the path that her message will take. Instead,
Atom provides anonymous broadcasting without cover traffic
and security based on indistinguishability of permutations at
a higher latency.
Loopix [61] is a recent system that provides asynchronous
bidirectional anonymous messaging, and scales horizontally.
Loopix can provide low-latency communication using servers
that insert small amount of delays before routing the mes-
sages. However, the security guarantees of Loopix degrade as
the fraction of adversarial servers increases. In contrast, Atom
provides a way to remain secure even when a large fraction of
servers are actively malicious, at the cost of polylogarithmic
increase in the latency due to larger group sizes. MCMix [7]
is another system that provides bidirectional anonymous mes-
saging, but using multiparty computation (MPC). MCMix
achieves better performance than Atom by defending against
a weaker adversary. The MCMix prototype, for example, only
supports three-server MPC that provides security against one
passively malicious server.
The security analysis of Atom draws on the theoretical
analysis of permutation networks. Permutation networks
have long been studied as a way to permute a large num-
ber of elements using a network built of small components
(“switches”) [73]. In a 1993 paper, Rackoff and Simon [63]
proposed building a distributed mix-net from a large permu-
tation network. Their scheme required O(logk n) iterations
of mixing to mix n messages, where k was a “double-digit”
number [25]. In Atom, we convert this theoretical result into
a practical one. Abe also proposed building a distributed
mix-net from a butterfly permutation network [4], though the
construction had a flawed security analysis [5].
Recent theoretical work investigated the number of itera-
tions of a butterfly network required so that a random setting
of the switches produces a random permutation [52–54]. Czu-
maj and Vo¨cking [26] have recently argued that O(log2(M))
iterations are enough to generate an “almost” random per-
mutation of M inputs. Czumaj [23] also studied randomly
constructed networks and demonstrated that most networks
of depth O(log2(M)) and width O(M) produce good random
permutations. Ha˚stad studied a permutation network [40]
based on shuffling the rows and columns of a square ma-
trix. Any of these networks could be used as the underlying
topology for an Atom network, but we focused on using the
network by Ha˚stad [40] due to its efficiency.
9 Conclusion
Atom is a traffic-analysis resistant anonymous messaging sys-
tem that scales horizontally. To achieve strong anonymity and
scalability, Atom divides servers into many anytrust groups,
and organizes them into a carefully constructed topology.
Using these groups, we design an efficient protocol for col-
lectively shuffling and rerandomizing ciphertexts to protect
users’ privacy. We then propose two mechanisms, based on
zero-knowledge proof techniques and trap messages, to pro-
tect against actively malicious servers. Finally, we provide
a low-overhead fault-recovery mechanism for Atom. Our
evaluation of Atom prototype on a distributed network con-
sisting of over one thousand servers demonstrates that the
system scales linearly as the number of participating servers
increases. We also demonstrated that Atom can support more
than a million users for microblogging and dialing. With its
distributed and scalable design, Atom takes traffic-analysis-
resistant anonymity one step closer to real-world practicality.
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A Cryptographic details
We describe a modification to the ElGamal cryptosystem [32]
for Atom. We work in a cyclic group G of order q with
generator g in which the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem
is hard [13]. The space of messages, ciphertexts, and public
keys is G∪{⊥}, where ⊥ represents a special null element.
• (x,X)← KeyGen(). Sample x←R Zq and set X = gx ∈G.
• (R,c,Y )← Enc(X ,m). Sample r←R Zq and set R← gr.
Set c← m · X r, and Y = ⊥. (R,c) forms the ElGamal
ciphertext, and Y is a new element for Atom.
• m← Dec(x,(R,c,Y )). Return m← c/Rx. The symbol
“/” indicates multiplication by the inverse of the second
operand. If Y 6=⊥, then the algorithm fails.
• C′ ← Shuffle(X ,C). To rerandomize a single ciphertext
(R,c,⊥) for public key X , sample r′ ← Zq and compute
(gr
′ ·R,c ·X r′ ,⊥). If Y 6= ⊥, then the algorithm fails. To
shuffle, rerandomize all ciphertexts and then permute them.
• (R′,c′,Y ′)← ReEnc(x,X ′,(R,c,Y )). If Y = ⊥, then set
Y = R and R = 1G, where 1G is the multiplicative identity
of G. The algorithm proceeds in two steps: First, remove a
layer of encryption using x: ctmp← c/Y x. Then, reencrypt
for X ′: sample r′← Zq and set R′← gr′ ·R and Y ′ =Y . Set
c′← ctmp ·X ′r
′
.
Intuitively, Y holds the randomness used to encrypt for
the current group, while R holds the randomness used to
encrypt for the next group. By keeping both Y and R, the
servers in the current group can decrypt out-of-order. In
Atom, before the last server of a group forwards (R′,c′,Y ′)
to the next group, it sets Y ′ =⊥; at this point, all layers of
encryption by the current group have been peeled off, and
c′ is encrypted only under X ′, making Y ′ unnecessary.
We use a key encapsulation scheme with ElGamal for our
IND-CCA2 encryption scheme for inner ciphertexts.
• (x,X)← KeyGen(). Sample x←R Zq and set X = gx ∈G.
• (R,c)← Enc(X ,m). Sample r ←R Zq, and set R← gr.
Generate a shared secret k = X r = gxr, and set c ←
AEnc(k,m) where AEnc is an authenticated symmetric en-
cryption scheme. For Atom, we used NaCl [12] for AEnc.
• m← Dec(x,(R,c)). Generate the shared secret k = Rx =
gxr. Set m← ADec(k,c), where ADec is the decryption
routine for AEnc.
Finally, we describe the NIZKs we use.
• (c,pi)← EncProof(pk,m). Compute the ciphertext (gr,m ·
X r,⊥)← Enc(X ,m), and keep r. Pick a random s ∈ Zq.
Then, compute t = H(c‖gs‖X), and u = s+ t · r, where H
is a cryptographic hash function. Set c = (gr,m ·X r,⊥)
and pi = (gs,u).
To verify this proof, a verifier checks that gu = gs ·grt .
• (c,pi) ← ReEncProof(sk, pk,m). We use the Chaum-
Pedersen proof [20] without any modifications.
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Figure 13: Required size of each group to maintain the security
guarantees for different values of h for f = 0.2 and G = 1,024.
• (C′,pi)← ShufProof(pk,C). We use the Neff verifiable
shuffle [59] without any modifications.
For EncProof, the same proof pi cannot be used for two dif-
ferent public keys, since the public key X is given as input
to H when computing t. This prevents an adversary from
copying the ciphertext and the NIZK submitted to one group,
and submitting them to a different group.
B Many-trust group size
Atom handles server churns using many-trust groups, as de-
scribed in §4.5. To tolerate up to h− 1 server failures in a
group, each many-trust group needs at least h honest servers.
We create such groups with high probability by increasing
the group size. Let k be the group size, f be the fraction
of malicious servers, and G be the number of groups in the
network. Similar to the analysis done in §4.1 for the anytrust
groups, we need
G ·Pr[fewer than h honest servers in a group of k servers]
= G ·
h−1
∑
i=0
Pr[i honest servers in a group of k servers]
= G ·
h−1
∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1− f )i f k−i < 2−64
Figure 13 shows the required size of the groups k as a function
of h when f = 0.2, and G = 1024.
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